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Abstract
The paper analyzes the impact of voucher privatization scheme on behavior of
households and its consequences for macroeconomic policy. The stylized facts of the voucher
privatization scheme are described for the Czech case. The consumption as well as portfolio
decision of households during the voucher scheme are modeled within the framework of
consumption function and a system of demand functions for financial assets. The envelope
theorem is used to modify the standard AID system. The empirical results are presented. The
paper concludes that the  interdependence between privatization and macroeconomic stability
should be better understood by policy makers in transitional countries that are going to adopt a
similar approach of privatization to the one applied in the Czech Republic.
Keywords: Voucher Privatization, Czech Republic, Macroeconomic Policy.2
1. Introduction
This paper aims to analyze the impact of voucher privatization schemes on behavior of
households and its consequences for macroeconomic policy. In  transitional countries that are
going to adopt a similar approach of privatization, the  interdependence between privatization
and macroeconomic stability should be better understood by policy makers. During transition,
one of the important policy targets for the government is macroeconomic stability. At the
same time, there is a need to privatize a significant portion of the state property in the
environment of emerging financial markets and low domestic liquidity. One of the methods
available to do this is a voucher privatization scheme that transfers a large portion of the state
wealth into  the hands of households. An increase in wealth  has important consequences for
both consumption as well as portfolio decision of households that both affect macroeconomic
stability of the economy. The paper analyses the Czech experience with the impact of voucher
privatization scheme on behavior of households since the Czech Republic was the first
country among transitional economies that adopted a voucher privatization scheme.
First, we summarize the stylized facts. The capital transfer in the form of voucher
shares 
2 increased financial wealth of households to a degree that was not easy to
accommodate. Households  cashed the undesired portion of voucher shares by selling them to
other sectors. The embryonic financial markets left households with only two main options for
allocation of income from capital gains - consumption of goods or  savings in the form of
traditional term deposits. We develop here a methodology for econometric evaluation of the
two-stage decision process of households. In the first stage, households decide between
consumption and savings given their income, wealth and the real interest rate. In the second
stage, they adjust the structure of portfolio to relative rates of return of available financial
assets. The econometric estimation of the demand system is a complicated issue since voucher
shares were not available prior to introduction of voucher privatization scheme. We apply an
envelope theorem in an Almost Ideal Demand System framework in order  to find a
corresponding model. Our empirical results correspond to our hypothesis of significant
positive impact of an increase in wealth on demand for goods as well as financial assets.
The macroeconomic consequences of the voucher privatization scheme depend on the
degree of capital mobility. In the case of low mobility, the consequences are similar to those
of fiscal expansion. In the case of high capital mobility, the consequences are similar to fiscal3
expansion combined with monetary restriction. Two main approaches of policy responses are
outlined. First, a slow-adjustment approach requires the economy to undergo a period of
external imbalance or higher inflation. Second, a fast-adjustment approach demands a change
in macroeconomic policy that would neutralize the impacts of a wealth transfer. Both
approaches have advantages and disadvantages. For example, if the central bank is responsible
for internal and external stability of a currency, it can face considerable difficulties when
managing consequences of the voucher privatization. Monetary policy may not be powerful
enough to keep aggregate demand within the  targeted range under a fixed-exchange rate
regime that is usually a part of stabilization package. Hence policy coordination is needed in
order to employ either  fiscal restriction or a change in exchange rate regime when
neutralizing impacts of voucher privatization scheme.
2. Voucher Privatization and Households´ Demand for Consumption Goods and
Financial Assets: The Czech Case
In this section we present some important stylized facts that illustrate the behavior of
households after the voucher privatization scheme was introduced. In the Czech Republic, the
voucher privatization scheme was implemented as a sequence of six events that one after
another increased the Czech households’ financial wealth (See Figure 1)
3. In December 1992,
households that invested indirectly (through the investment privatization funds) in the first
wave of voucher privatization were given  advanced payments  for their vouchers since the
funds competed for new customers. In June 1993, households who invested directly (by
bidding with vouchers for shares of enterprises in several rounds) got their shares. In January
1994, households who invested indirectly received their shares of investment funds.  A similar
scenario held for the second wave of the voucher privatization
4.4
Figure 1.  Voucher Privatization:  Sequence of Shocks to Financial Wealth of
Households  (billion of CZK).
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Data Source: Czech Ministry of Privatization, Fund of National Property.
Notes: In the first wave of voucher privatization, households that invested indirectly (through the investment
privatization funds) were given  advanced payments in December 1992. In June 1993, households who invested
directly got their shares of enterprises. In January 1994, households who invested indirectly got their shares of
investment funds. In the second wave, households that invested indirectly were given  advanced payments in
November 1994.  In March  1995, households who invested directly got their shares of enterprises. Households
who invested indirectly were expected to receive their shares of investment funds in the second half of 1995. A
distribution of shocks is our own approximation based on reports of the Fund of National Property. Data in
billion of CZK (Czech crown).5





































































































































Data Sources: Czech National Bank, Czech Statistical Office.
Notes: The changes in the structure of financial wealth of households are shown from the end of 1991 to the
beginning of 1995. Hence the impact of the second wave is not captured fully here. The reported financial assets
and liabilities of households are as follows: credits (Cr), narrow money - currency and checkable deposits  (L),
term deposits (D) and deposits in foreign currency (F). The stock of shares held by households (V) is our own
approximation. We define Vt =(Pt / Pt-1 )Vt-1  + ∆Vp t  + Vg t , where Vt is the current stock of shares  held by
households, and  Pt  is a market price index of voucher shares as quoted on the Prague Stock Exchange, ∆Vp t  is
net purchase of voucher shares (approximated from the Balance of Income and Expenditures of Households) and
Vg t is a government transfer. There is a strong  seasonal pattern in the level of term deposits in the end of each
year because the major Czech commercial banks used an accounting system in which they  wrote-up a majority of
interest-rate earnings uniformly on December, 31. There was a switch of holdings of narrow money into termed
deposits in February 1993 due to the monetary dissolution of the former Czechoslovakia
5.
It follows that there are two sources for the financial  wealth of households increasing:
(i) savings, the standard source and (ii) a “transitional source” - transfers of voucher  shares.
The Czech experience suggests that the latter temporarily becomes the  most dynamic part of
the financial wealth of households (See Figure 2). The nominal increase in the financial
wealth of households during both waves of voucher privatization was ex ante approximately
equal to the level of net monetary wealth in 1993. Although the fall in the Prague Stock
Exchange index has reduced the size of this shock partially, the ex post increase in wealth was
still considerable. It is important to note that the voucher privatization scheme played a role of
a financial innovation since it has become possible for households to diversify among
monetary and non-monetary assets. The two definitions of wealth (monetary and financial)
started diverging only in 1993. Interestingly, the level of credits given to households remained
nearly constant during the period signaling that households were unable to overcome the6
transitional period of depressed real incomes by borrowing. However, they used the voucher
transfer as a substitute for consumer credit to some extent
6.
Czech households spent a significant portion of  their disposable income
7 on
consumption of goods and services during the transitional period (See Figure 3). The average
saving ratio was 18%. However, consumption exceeded wage income which was the main
source of disposable income  prior to a transitional period. The other sources of income have
started playing an increasingly important role since the introduction of the restitution program,
the voucher privatization scheme and capital markets. Hence without large capital transfers,
ceteris paribus, the saving ratio would have been much lower.














































































































































Data Source: Czech National Bank, Czech Statistical Office.
Notes: The reported monthly series are as follows: total nominal disposable income (Yd), wage nominal income
(Yw), private nominal consumption (C) - scaled on the left axes, and saving ratio (S) defined as (Yd-C)/Yd-
scaled on the right axes. The difference between wage and disposable income is “other income” that includes
insurance payments, interest payments and estimates of capital gains and dividends from voucher shares.
When investing their savings into financial assets, the Czech households faced four
main options: transaction money (narrow money), term deposits, deposits in foreign currency
and voucher shares. Other types of financial assets such as government bonds, foreign
securities, and pension schemes were not available on a large scale during the analyzed period
due to embryonic stage of relevant markets or limited convertibility of the Czech crown.
Transaction money earned a constant and low rate of return around 2 % (See Figure 4).7














































































































































Data Source: Czech National Bank, Czech Statistical Office, Hospodarske Noviny (Economic News).
Notes: The reported rates of  return are as follows: interest rate on narrow money (Rl), interest rate on term
deposits (Rd), interest rate on deposits in foreign currency (Rf), inflation (p) and capital gains on voucher shares
(Rv) - labeled by the second axis. Note that voucher shares have been available only since December 1992.
Interest rates on term deposits felt slightly but remained at around 10 %  while
deposits in foreign currency provided small investors with consistantly lower gains as a result
of the successful strategy of pegging the exchange rate. When market with voucher shares
emerged, the prices stared falling after an initial period of volatility. As a result, the expected
return from investing into voucher share considerably fell
8. This explains why term deposits
kept their role of major portfolio asset for the Czech households. Inflation has not remained
stable in the analyzed three years. Due to a problem of  accommodating the two important
transitional shocks - price liberalization in 1991 and the introduction of VAT in 1993 - there
was a  problem of a persistent double-digit inflation. One could hardly  find  longer period of
time during which the real interest rate on deposits was positive especially when considering
after-tax returns. Consequently, the portfolio motives for building up the real wealth were
weak. One the other hand, there was an increase in uncertainty during transition that might
have forced  households to save relatively more. The real monetary  wealth
9 of households
(measured in  Czech crowns in constant prices of 1984) did not reach its pre-transitional level
until 1995. In December 1989, it stood at  181 billion and was reduced to 137 billion in
December 1991. It recovered to 139 billion in December 1992, to 141 billion in December
1993 and 155 billion in December 1994. The real financial wealth coincident with monetary8
wealth until 1992  stood at 151 billion in December 1993 and at  185 billion in December
1994.
3. A Theoretical Framework for Estimating the Two-Stage Decision Model
In this section, we present a model of the two-stage decision process of households
that provide a framework for the partial analysis of consequences of voucher privatization for
economic policy. Specifically, we aimed to quantify the importance of the following factors:
the impact of increase in financial wealth on consumption (ie. which portion of voucher shares
was cashed); the feasibility of  neutralizing the impact via restrictive monetary policy,  the
impact of relative rates of return on the structure of financial wealth (and which portion of
voucher shares remained in the portfolio after the initial adjustment had taken place); and
what the main substitute for shares was. The empirical estimates of the models of both stages
are presented in the next section.
We model the decision process of households in the two stages. In the first stage,
households determine their consumption of goods and services given their financial wealth,
disposable income and the rates of return on financial assets:
(1) C= c(W/P, Yd/P, R, p),
where C is real consumption of households, W  is financial wealth, P is consumer price
index, Yd is nominal disposable income, R is rate of return on the marginal financial asset and
p is expected inflation. We would expect ∂c/∂(W/P)>0, ∂c/∂(Yd/P)>0, ∂c/∂R<0 and ∂c/∂p>0.
Based on the stylized facts discussed in the previous section, we hypothesize that the
level of financial wealth should be a significant determinant of a consumption decision for
two reasons. First, most households were likely to be restricted by credit rationing. Hence they
only could smooth their consumption path by reducing their financial wealth when real
disposable income felt during transition. Second, their affected by several significant
exogenous shocks. Specifically, each transfer of voucher shares expanded the level of wealth.
The stylized facts suggest that a part of the newly gained wealth was cashed and consumed.
We include the interest rate on termed deposits as a rate of return on a marginal  asset
(together with expected inflation) in order to evaluate the potential scope for monetary policy
to neutralize the impact of shocks to wealth. Term deposits were chosen as the marginal asset
since their returns have always dominated those of the other assets and since households
maintained the share of term deposits in wealth even after introduction of voucher shares. As a9
result, we have got a consumption function analogous to what is suggested in Hendry,
Muellbauer and Murphy (1990).
In the second stage, households determine the structure of their financial  portfolio
according to rates of return on available assets. Similarly to the first stage decision, portfolio
decisions are affected significantly by the transitional strategy of the authorities. We search for
a  model capturing the following features of a transitional economy: (i) prior to time T
households could diversify their portfolio only across the relatively  homogenous group of
monetary assets (deposits), (ii) at time T,  the new financial asset was introduced via the
voucher privatization scheme allowing for households to diversify portfolio across larger and
more heterogeneous group of assets, and (iii) since time T, financial wealth of households has
been increased in several waves of transfers.
In our previous study Allen, Smidkova (1996) we applied an envelope theorem to the
Almost Ideal Demand system in order to derive a constant parameter demand system which is
robust to this type of financial innovation. The system approach for estimating asset demands
has been extensively used due to improved efficiency in estimation and straightforward
interpretability. Barr and Cuthbertson (1991, 1994) and Dinenis and Scott (1992) provide
recent applications. To account for the progressive introduction of voucher shares, we have
made use of an envelope relationship from duality theory. Assume that households´ asset
demand behavior can be characterized by a cost function, the minimum cost of obtaining a
given level of asset utility, given the set of rates of return (or their reciprocals seen as prices).
Household utility is given by the same underlying preferences over the whole period.
However, prior to the introduction of  voucher shares, it is characterized by a restricted cost
function, because of non-availability of voucher shares. The envelope theorem allows us to
explicitly link the parameters of the restricted and non-restricted cost functions by deriving the
shadow price of the non-available shares. Although, in a general case, it has been found
difficult to derive closed form solutions to such a problem using flexible functional form such
as Almost Ideal Demand system, in the case of a zero restriction, we were able to derive a
particularly simple relationship between asset demands prior to an after the introduction of
voucher shares
10. Specifically, the restricted  demand shares equation can be written in the
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where the unavailable asset is indexed with i,  sk
R  is a restricted share of kth asset in the
financial wealth, a and g are parameters of the almost ideal demand system and pl  is a price of
the ith asset defined as (1+Rl)
-1 with Rl being rate of return on the ith asset.
Hence we are able to relate these restricted demands to unrestricted demands and
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where δ  is a dummy variable equal to one prior T and equal to zero from period T onwards.
4. The Econometric Results
For the purposes of estimation, we use two monthly data sources: the Balance of
Income and Expenditures of Households and the Monetary Survey. Our sample going from
December 1991 to March 1995 covers both the pre-privatization period as well as the one of
the first wave of voucher privatization. There are several assumptions we have made. Price
expectations are  adaptive. This seems to be a plausible assumption  for  a transition period in
which households had to accommodate large institutional as well as economic changes in a
very fast sequence consequences of which were difficult to predict. We approximate the rate
of return on voucher shares by capital gains as implied by the Index of the Czech National
Bank for the Prague Stock Exchange
11. We construct the rate on deposits in foreign currency
as rate of return with the zero exchange-rate risk
12. We neglect that  difference between taxed
and untaxed rates of return
13. We  define term deposits as net term  deposits (term deposits
minus credits given to households).
We estimated the models of both the first-stage and the second-stage decisions of
households. In general, we followed a methodology developed in Hendry (1995) for
estimating dynamic systems. However, several structural breaks affected the size and the
structure of  financial wealth. Moreover, our sample period was extremely short, containing
only 40 observations. Hence we do not report the standard unit root and co-integration tests
here since they have only limited power
14. Note that our assumption that share prices and
inflationary expectations are adaptive and the fact that the crown was credibly fixed against a
basket of foreign currencies allow us to avoid the complications of rational expectation
models. The econometric estimates of  the consumption function of the Czech households are
presented in Table 1.11
Table 1. The Error-correction Model of Consumption Function
Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic
χ1 -0.445  0.174 -2.563
χ2 -0.492  0.139 -3.543
χ3  0.421  0.210  2.001
χ4 -4.967  1.986 -2.501
χ5  0.680  0.080  8.543
χ6  0.366  0.206  1.774
Note:  After following the general-to-specific approach, the model was finally estimated in this form:
∆c=χ1+χ2.{c-χ3.y-(1-χ3).w-χ4.(R-p)}-1+ χ5.∆y+χ6.∆w, where c is logarithm of real consumption of households, y
is logarithm of real disposable income, w is logarithm of real financial wealth, R is  interest rate on termed
deposits and p is inflation rate. Sample: 1992:02 1995:03. Statistics: Adjusted R-squared 0.737, S.E. 0.057, Sum
squared resid 0.104,  Durbin-Watson stat 1.954. The sample means of explanatory variables are as follows:
mean(c)=2.808, mean(y)=3.003, mean(w)= 5.039, mean(R-p)= -0.017, mean(∆y)=0.005, mean(∆w)=0.008.
From the reported estimates we are able to derive two main conclusions. First, there is
a statistically significant impact of  a wealth variable in the estimated consumption functions
which does not depend on a selected type of dynamic form of the model. Hence the first-stage
decision of households is likely to be influenced by any significant increase in financial
wealth. According to our model, asset  transfers to the hands of households (such as were
implied by voucher privatization) tend to expand consumption of households at least
temporarily. When comparing the sample means of explanatory variables (See Note, Table 1),
one can conclude that wealth variable was economically influential
15 since the means of both
real financial wealth as well as its growth rate were of a comparable scale to those of real
disposable income.
Second, on one hand,  the impacts of increase in real income and wealth on
consumption are of a similar magnitude. This conclusion follows from both the estimated
elasticities as well as sample means presented in the note of Table 1. The estimated income
elasticity was 0.42 for error-correction model. The wealth elasticity was estimated 0.58. On
the other hand, given the sample mean of real interest rate and the estimated real interest rate
semi-elasticity (-4.97), the impact of the interest-rate variable was not very high. This implies
that in order to neutralize the effect of an increase in real wealth on consumption of
households, ceteris paribus, either real disposable income need to be reduced by a percentage
rate approximately equal to the rate of a wealth increase or real interest rate need to be
increased by several percentage points
16.
The empirical model of the second-stage decision of households during which their
financial portfolio is formed was derived according to the methodology explained in the12
previous section. In our empirical work, we have found that a partial adjustment mechanism
was adequate to characterize all empirical dynamics. Because of singularity in the error terms,
we  dropped out equation for share of term deposits. The parameters of this equation can be
fully derived from those of the estimated equations as discussed in Anderson and Blundell





where St  is a (n-1)x1 vector of  shares of financial assets in financial wealth, εt is a (n-
1)x1 vector of standard error terms and K is a (n-1)xn a matrix of adjustment coefficients. S
*
t
is a (n-1)x1 vector of optimal shares defined as A.xt, where A is a  (n-1)xn matrix of long run
coefficients and xt is a  nx1 vector of [1, p] (p is a vector of the logs of relative prices).
Table 2 presents the estimated parameters
17 that are despite the short sample period
reasonable well determined and are consistent with the postulates of demand theory. Hence
we were able to define the demand system with constant coefficients consistent with empirical
evidence. The empirical results can be summarized as follows. A vector of constant shares of
financial assets in the wealth approximates what the long-run shares would be if no change in
relative prices took place. Interestingly, while shares of all monetary assets are significant (and
have the expected signs), the portfolio share of voucher shares is not significantly different
from zero. One can argue that the zero restriction on supply of voucher shares was not binding
for households´ demand for financial assets, and that the newly introduced voucher shares
were in this sense oversupplied. Even after voucher privatization took place, households as
“conservative” portfolio makers continued to store their financial wealth in the form of
deposits. In this context, it is worth analyzing which assets served as substitutes for voucher
shares.





αL  .469  .024  19.896
αF  .144  .210   68.508
αV -.029  .041     -.704
Price Share Elasticities
γLL -.423  .198 -2.144
γLF -.004  .007   -.500
γLV -.018  .024   -.73413
γFF -.005  .002 -2.268
γFV -.011  .004 -2.536
γVV -.028  .035   -.786
Adjustment Parameters
KLL   .796   .085  9.313
KLF   .033   .100   .328
KLV   .478   .068  6.992
KFL  -.048   .041 -1.192
KFF   .083   .025  3.291
KFV  -.057   .028 -1.990
KVL -1.509   .178 -8.467
KVF -3.807   .537 -7.095
KVV -1.113   .166 -6.712
Note: Estimated by maximum likelihood. Log of Likelihood Function: 475.428. Sample: 1992:01 1995:03. The
parameters are defined as follows: αk is a long-run parameter of a kth  financial asset´s share in wealth. γkl  is a
long-run parameter of elasticity of demand for kth asset with respect to a relative price of lth asset. Kkl  is a short-
run parameter of adjustment of kth asset´s  share to a disequilibrium on the market with lth asset. L stays for
narrow money, F for foreign deposits and V for voucher shares. The sample means of shares of four alternative
financial assets in total financial wealth are as follows: mean(L)=0.39, mean(D)=0.40, mean(F)=0.10,
mean(V)=0.11. However, while the shares of monetary assets remained relatively stable, the annual mean of the
share of voucher shares changed dramatically from  zero in 1992 to 20 percent in 1994.
Table 3 reports the relevant interest-rate and price (semi)-elasticities implied by our
econometric estimates. Own-return interest rate semi-elasticities are around 2 for narrow
money and term deposits and around unity for deposits in foreign currency and voucher
shares. These are somewhat lower than elasticities commonly found for market economies,
but this may not be surprising since there was a very much smaller range of assets available to
households in the Czech Republic.
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Note: Interest rate semi-elasticities and compensated price elasticities are evaluated at sample means. t-statistics
in brackets.
A very interesting set of elasticities of substitution emerges. Term deposits are a
substitute for every other asset, with narrow money being the closest substitute. Narrow
money is the main both gross and net substitute to term deposits. Income and substitution
effects of a rise in narrow money returns cancel each other in the case of  deposits in foreign
currency and voucher shares. The intriguing net complementarity of voucher shares and
foreign currency deposits appears to be mostly due to income effects, the compensated
substitution effect between the two is zero. In summary, a rise in relative price of voucher
shares that came next to the voucher privatization scheme was accommodated by an increase
in the share of term deposits.
5. Implications for Macroeconomic Policy
In this section, we illustrate results of our empirical analysis of behavior of households
within the standard Mundell-Fleming model for a small open economy as summarized for
example in Gandolfo (1987). Then we summarize the implications for economic policy. In
order to depict the short-term consequences of voucher privatization,  we make two
assumptions corresponding to our stylized facts.
First, government consumption and investment are not affected by the voucher
privatization scheme on a scale comparable to the impact on the consumption of households.
Specifically, Ricardian equivalence does not hold. Hence after the transfer of voucher shares
to the hands of households government consumption is not reduced adequately to adjust the
fall in assets. The economic significance of the real wealth to consumption decisions of
households has been demonstrated in the previous section. It is also worth noting that the
voucher shares have been the most dynamic part of the financial wealth as can be seen from
Figure 2.
Secondly, during the implementation of the voucher privatization scheme, demand for
money by other sectors is relatively stable while demand for money by households is formed
mainly by the money-to-wealth ratio. This assumption is in accordance with the empirical
results presented in Tables 2 and 3 (See also Notes in Table 2). While normalized price series
remained stationary, the ratio of voucher shares to financial wealth changed dramatically from
zero to 16 percent. Hence money-to-wealth ratio was  significantly reduced by the15
introduction of the voucher privatization scheme. Consequently, the domestic interest rate
were likely to be pushed up during the adjustment process unless the effect was sterilized by
the central bank. We determine the equilibrium real exchange rate and output by expressing
internal and external  balances in two equations:
(5) RR: c(Yd, W, 1/P, r)+D=Y
∂c/∂Yd>0, ∂c/∂W>0, ∂c/∂(1/P)<0, ∂d/∂r<0, where c is real consumption of households, Yd is
nominal disposable income of households, W is their nominal financial wealth, 1/P is real
exchange rate (note that due to a fixed exchange rate regime and relatively stable foreign
prices it is possible to substitute an inverse domestic price level for real exchange rate), r is
domestic real interest rate, D is real demand by other sectors (government consumption,
investment and exports) and Y is real output.
(6) BB: ca(Y, e)+ka(M/W, R*+ρ)=κ
∂ca/∂Y<0, ∂ca/∂e>0, ∂ka/∂(M/W) <0, ∂ka/∂(R*+ρ)<0, where ca is current account (due to
assumptions of stable foreign prices and fixed exchange rate real and nominal units coincide),
e is real exchange rate (e=1/P), ka is capital account, M/W is a ratio of monetary to total
financial wealth held by households, R* is foreign interest rate and ρ is a proxy for country
risk (including exchange rate risk) and κ is external position targeted by authorities.
We start in  the short-run equilibrium E1 (See Figure 5). According to our empirical
findings, voucher privatization moves, ceteris paribus, the RR schedule to the right
(RR1→RR2) due to a significant impact of real financial wealth on consumption of
households. As far as the external balance is concerned, the impact of voucher privatization
depends on the elasticity of capital flows to domestic interest rates. Specifically, if the capital
mobility is high, the voucher privatization tends to attract capital inflows at least temporarily.
In this case,  the BB schedule shifts to the right (BB1→BB2), and the new short-run
equilibrium is at E2.16
Figure 5. Consequences of Voucher Privatization:
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Note.: An increase in e  means real depreciation.
If there are restrictions on capital account operations and consequently low capital
mobility, the BB schedule does not move, and the new short-run equilibrium is at E3. Note
that the sensitivity of capital flows to voucher privatization does not depend only on the level
of domestic currency convertibility. It also depends on characteristics of an emerged equity
market. Specifically, if newly introduced voucher shares are not attractive to foreign investors
(e.g. due to the low transparency of the market) and the liquidity of the equity market is low,
the size  of transfer is reduced rapidly by a fall in prices on the stock exchange. Consequently,
the ratio of monetary to total financial wealth returns to its pre-privatization level
18.
In the first case, the new short-run equilibrium (E2) brings higher output and real
appreciation of domestic currency. In the case of a fixed exchange rate, the domestic currency
is undervalued. The economy adjusts to the new equilibrium with domestic inflation and can
run a current account deficit (eg. at E4). In the case of a more flexible exchange rate regime,
the nominal exchange rate would adjust by appreciation. In the second case, the new short-run
equilibrium (E3) brings higher output too. However, domestic currency is overvalued. There is
a real depreciation of a currency either by downwards adjustment of domestic prices (together
with a balance of payments deficit) under a fixed-exchange rate or by nominal depreciation of
currency under more flexible regime. This implies that the consequences of voucher
privatization are similar to those of fiscal expansion in the case of low capital mobility while17
in the first case they correspond to outcome of a policy mix of  fiscal expansion and monetary
contraction. The  Czech experience seems to fit to the scenario with high capital mobility (See
Table 4).
Table 4. Czech Economic Indicators: Years of Voucher Privatization
1993 1994 1995
Real Output   -0.9%   2.6%   4.8%
Consumption of Households    2.9%   5.3%   6.4%
Government Spending   -0.1%  -2.3%  -4.3%
Current Account to GDP    1%  -1%  -3.2%
Capital Account to GDP    8%   7%  16.5%
Voucher Shares to GDP  19%  17%  37%
Inflation (CPI)  21%  10%    9.5%
Nominal Exchange Rate
(CZK/DEM)
 17.64  17.75  18.5
Data Source: Annual Report, 1995, Czech National Bank.
Note: The reported   ratio of voucher shares to GDP was equal to zero in 1992.
In summary, the voucher privatization scheme has some important implications for
macroeconomic policy. Transfers of voucher shares have impact on both stages of allocation
decisions of households. In the first stage, households use it to overcome a liquidity constraint
and they increase their consumption of goods. Hence there is a potential demand pressure on
the current account balance. In the second stage, households adjust their financial portfolio
using  broad money as substitute for voucher shares. Consequently, there is a potential danger
of short-term capital flows, and inflation pressure.
What are the policy options? The first option is to keep the exchange rate fixed and  let
the adjustment process to restore internal and external balances without changes in monetary
or fiscal policy. However, there are some costs involved that may make this approach
unfeasible. Specifically, in the case of low capital mobility caused either by restricted
convertibility or by restricted access of foreign investors to the equity market, foreign reserves
need to be high enough to cushion temporary external deficit (the adjustment might be very
fast if the transfer of vouchers shares looses its purchasing power rapidly).With capital
mobility, the medium-run consequences are ambiguous since they depend on the persistence
of capital inflow. On one hand, inflationary pressure of  capital inflows may be difficult to
overcome due to the costs of sterilization policy by the central bank.  On the other hand, the
economy builds up foreign reserves  allowing it to handle a overvaluation of the currency.
Regardless of the degree of  capital mobility, the most adequate policy response in the
case of a fragile external position of economy is restrictive fiscal policy. Following a  voucher
privatization scheme, a balanced budget may not be enough to protect economy from demand-18
push imbalances; a fiscal contraction should be adequate to outweigh the size of the transfer.
However, it is usually the central  bank who is responsible for external and internal stability of
domestic currency. The bank can employ restrictive monetary policy to restore balances, but
the success of this strategy   is limited by capital mobility as well as sensitivity of
consumption to interest rates. With low capital mobility, the chances are higher since higher
interest rates would not attract speculative flows. Nevertheless, empirical results suggest that
an increase in interest rates necessary to neutralize the impact of voucher transfer might be too
costly for the central bank due to potential recession costs. With capital mobility, the
possibilities of monetary policy are much more limited. If there is no room for fiscal or
monetary contraction, the only remaining option for the policy makers is to change the
exchange rate regime. Specifically, broadening bands around central parity seem to have two
advantages. First, it can speed up the adjustment process by nominal depreciation in the case
of low capital mobility or appreciation in the case of high capital mobility leaving less room
for depletion of foreign reserves or inflationary pressure. Second, in the case of high capital
mobility, capital flows  are  likely to play a role of short-term adjustment mechanism. Thus
the broad band allowing  for exchange rate fluctuations  seem to be superior to a simple
revaluation of central parity.
Endnotes.
1  The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors, and do not necessarily represent those of the
Czech National Bank. Authors  would like to thank for comments and suggestions to Jean-Luis Brillet, Stephen
Hall, Malinka Koparanova and two anonymous referees.
2 The voucher privatization scheme is one of examples of how the government increases wealth of households
during transition. Similar consequences for consumption and portfolio decisions of households may be induced
by  a restitution process.
3 Each wave of a voucher privatization scheme was based on  a transfer of vouchers from the hands of the
Czech government to the hands of households. Those citizens who wanted to participate paid a registration fee of
1,000 CZK (Czech crowns) in order to get booklet of vouchers. Then they could bid either directly or indirectly
via investment funds for voucher shares. In the first wave, the book value of vouchers in one booklet exceeded
the fee by more than thirty times.  Consequently, financial wealth of households was increased significantly.
4  In the sake of simplicity, we neglect in our analysis the fact that there was a difference in a quality of
obtained assets. While advanced payments were liquid, the shares differed as far as a degree of liquidity is
concerned. In general, the shares of enterprises were more liquid than those of funds. Also, the shares of funds
become more undervalued during a fall of price index. One possible explanation is that there was even less19
information on the investment privatization funds available to investors than on  enterprises themselves. In
addition, managers of investment funds did not act in the interest of small shareholders.
5 When the Czech crown was separated from the Slovak crown, citizens of the newly established Czech
Republic were asked to deposit their cash holdings into commercial  banks in order to avoid large queues when
exchanging the old banknotes and coins for the  new ones. Hence households’ holdings of termed deposits
expanded during the week of a  currency dissolution.
6  One should observe that banks (and their investment privatization funds) accepted voucher shares as
collateral or exchanged the ownership rights with households for deposits.
7 Disposable income is defined in a standard way: Yd= Yw+Yx+Tr-T, where Yw is wage income, Yx is income
from other sources (insurance payments, interest payments),  Tr are  transfers and T is tax payment.
8 The expected return felt due to falling prices on the Prague Stock Exchange as well as very low dividends
paid to small shareholders in the emergence period. A lack of domestic liquidity and  illnesses of embryonic
financial markets were the reasons of falling prices on the stock exchange. See Smidkova (1996) for the analysis
of the process of  emergence of financial markets in the Czech Republic
9 Monetary (net) wealth is defined as Wm = L + D - Cr + F, where Wm is (net) monetary  wealth, L is narrow
money (currency plus checkable deposits),  D  is term deposits,  Cr is credits and  F is deposits in foreign
currencies. Until voucher privatization took place, the concept of financial wealth coincided with the concept of
monetary wealth. Once the voucher shares were introduced by the government, we define financial wealth as W=
Wm +V, where W is (net) financial wealth and V is voucher  shares.
10 We take a homothetic AIDs cost function in a standard log form:   lnC(u, p) = a0 + Σak.lnpk + 1/2.Σk Σl glk .
lnpk .lnpl + u.
 From Shephard´s  lemma, the unrestricted compensated demand functions for budget shares take the  form:  sk=
ak + Σl glk .lnpl .
Hence by inversion, we can derive the shadow price for a zero budget share of the restricted ith asset:  lnpi * = -
γii 
-1.(ai + Σ l≠i gli .lnpl ).
11 We are aware of the fact that it is only approximations since the majority of trading with voucher shares took
place outside the official markets. Our argument is that households did not have access to unofficial market with
large block of shares. We did not include dividends into our model since they were both insignificant  and
difficult to observe in the first years of transition.
12  We weighted  rate on DM deposits by 65% and the rate on $ deposits  by 35% in accordance with the
definition of a basket peg of the Czech crown.
13 It was not possible to define after tax return for sale of voucher shares While capital gains and  dividends
were taxed by 25%, the capital gains from  the first sale of the voucher shares were  not taxed at all (interest
earnings from  all monetary assets were taxed by 15%.).
14 We investigated the stationary properties of the data set by performing tests for the main forcing variables in
the model which are relative prices of financial assets. Although the assets prices are themselves non-stationary,
there was some evidence that the normalized series were stationary. Test lag selection procedure was on the basis
of Breusch-Godfrey LM test for up to third-order autocorrelation. The results for narrow money price relative to20
deposit price was ADF(1)=-4.224 (LM(3)=0.198) and for similarly normalized foreign currency price ADF(1)=-
6.853 (LM(3)=1.162).
15 We are grateful to our referee for making the point about importance of distinguishing between statistical
significance of the coefficients and the economically  influential variables. The problem of economic significance
is discussed in McCloskey and Ziliak (1996).
16 Although the ex post shock to real financial wealth was much  smaller than ex ante nominal shock, it can be
still approximated by 5-10% increase of real wealth in the first wave.
17 The more detailed analysis of econometric results was provided in our previous study Allen, Smidkova
(1996).
18 If households do not change their demand for shares during transition, each privatization wave is likely to
push prices of shares down unless there is a demand from other sectors. According to the Czech experience
analyzed in Smidkova (1996), households are  net seller of voucher shares (foreign and banking  sectors being
net buyers).
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